▶ JOSÉ M. MÉNDEZ, GEMMA ROBLES, FRANCISCO SALTO, *Paraconsistency and consistency understood as the absence of the negation of any implicative theorem.*
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As is stated in its title, in this paper consistency is understood as the absence of the negation of any implicative theorem. Then, we define the basic logic adequate to this concept of consistency in the ternary relational semantics with a set of designated points, negation being modelled with the Routley Star (see., e.g., [1]). Next, a series of logics extending this basic one is defined. All logics in this paper are paraconsistent, but none of them is relevant.

[1] R. Routley et al., ***Relevant Logics and their Rivals*** vol. 1, Atascadero, CA, Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1982.

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